ПЕТЕРБУРГСКИЙ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ ФОРУМ 4-6 ИЮНЯ 2009 ГОДА, САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГ

ФИНАНСОВЫЕ РЫНКИ: РИСКИ И РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ

Описание: Совместно с PWC
Взаимодействие между регуляторами разных стран; ключевые риски финансовой системы; новые форматы комплексного раскрытия информации; присвоение кредитных рейтингов и аудиторские требования; взаимодействие с регуляторами; межгосударственное регулирование деятельности рейтинговых агентств. Формирование независимых рейтинговых структур.

Модератор: Рубен Аганбегян, генеральный директор «Ренессанс Капитал» по России, председатель правления «Ренессанс Управление Инвестициями»

Участники дискуссии:

• Владимир Миловидов, руководитель ФСФР России
• Дэнис Нэлли, глава PricewaterhouseCoopers
• Тони Энджел, исполнительный управляющий директор Standard & Poor’s Europe, Middle East and Africa region
• Ричард Хантер, управляющий директор Fitch Ratings
• Йонг Хи Ли, главный исполнительный директор и президент NICE Investors Service Co., Ltd.
• Рональд Аркулли, председатель Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd.
• Доктор Стивен Дж. Мейджоор, генеральный директор Комитета по финансовым рынкам Нидерландов, председатель International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators
• Ховард Дэвис, ректор London School of Economics and Political Science

Стенограмма

Уважаемые господа, позвольте начать нашу дискуссию, наш круглый стол под названием "Финансовые рынки: риски и регулирование". Как вы понимаете, здесь собрались как раз те участники финансовых рынков, которые, собственно, и виноваты в кризисе. Это те, кто оценивал риски, те, кто проводил аудит. И, поскольку здесь вот такой состав участников, вести этот круглый стол предложили мне, журналисту. Журналисты – это следующая категория виновников в нынешнем мировом кризисе. В России особенно любят обвинять журналистов в том, что они виноваты в кризисе. Поэтому перед вами сидят истинные виновники развернувшегося финансово-экономического кризиса. И мы попытаемся отчасти оправдаться, и, возможно, ответить на ваши вопросы. О чем я вас только прошу: сначала обвиняйте джентльменов слева и справа от меня, в последнюю очередь можете обвинять меня. Я все-таки ведущий.

Я хочу представить участников дискуссии. Это Владимир Миловидов, руководитель Федеральной службы по финансовым рынкам в России. Деннис Нелли, глава Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Тони Энджел, исполнительный управляющий директор Standard & Poor’s Europe middle East and Africa Region. Ричард Хантер, управляющий директор Fitch Ratings. Йонг Хи Ли, главный исполнительный директор, президент NICE Investors Service Co., Ltd. Рональд Аркулли, председатель Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. Доктор Стивен Мейджор, генеральный директор Комитета по финансовым рынкам Нидерландов, председатель International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators. Ховард Дэвис, директор Лондонской школы экономики. И к нам присоединился Павел Теплухин. Про "Тройку Диалог" я ничего не буду говорить, на всякий случай.

Ситуация, как вы знаете, в пролом году была, с одной стороны, драматической, а с другой стороны очень интересной, особенно для журналистов, потому что так долго нам объясняли, что ситуация финансовая и экономическая стала принципиально другой, что теперь серьезные кризисы невозможны. Несколько ученых успели получить Нобелевские премии за работы, в которых он доказывали, что существуют способы принципиального уменьшения финансовых экономических рисков. И вдруг оказалось, что все не вполне так, что риски можно спрятать, но их нельзя уничтожить, что они все равно откуда-то вылезают, что экономическая система по-прежнему неустойчива и ничего принципиально не изменилось за прошедшие 200 лет с момента возникновения капитализма в его нынешнем виде. Ясно, что, по сравнению с тем, что было 200 лет назад мы имеем гораздо более развитую экономическую системы и ясно, что надо к ней относиться очень серьезно и она подлежит некоторой модернизации. Насколько принципиальной? Как только кризис стал очевиден, стали раздаваться голоса слева, голоса об усилении роли государства, требования национализации, обвинения субъектов рынка, обвинения рейтинговых агентств, обвинения аудиторов в том, что это они виноваты в происшедших событиях. Конечно, это не так. Конечно, причины кризиса лежат глубоко и можно обращаться к классикам экономической науки, у которых все про это написано. Тем не менее, очевидно, что систему надо каким-то образом модернизировать, именно в части финансовых рисков, и это мы сегодня должны здесь обсудить. Это и есть тема нашей сегодняшней дискуссии. Я хочу предоставить слово Владимиру Миловидову, руководителю ФСФР, для начала нашей дискуссии. Регламент будет таков: 5-7-10 минут выступления всех участников, потом вопросы, возможно, вопросы из зала, и затем второй круг – это уже свободная дискуссия. Владимир Дмитриевич, пожалуйста.

Спасибо большое. В качестве вступления хочу сказать, что на сегодняшний день сама тема, которая здесь поставлена, очень точно отражает те проблемы, которые проявились в ходе финансового кризиса. Если говорить совсем просто, рынок давно перестал быть рынком конкретного товара, конкретной ценной бумаги. В конечном счете, современные финансовые рынки – это рынки, на которых специфическим товаром является риск, где, по существу, торгуют риском. Для того, чтобы торговать риском, для того, чтоб оценивать эти риски и присваивать ему определенную стоимостную характеристику, для этого нужно обладать очень широким спектром информации, широким спектром знаний о том, что порождает этот риск: о ценных бумагах, о производстве, о компаниях, которые выпускают эти финансовые инструменты и ценные бумаги.

С моей точки зрения, учитывая, что наше сегодняшнее мероприятие является дискуссией, правильно будет обсудить какие-то дискуссионные вопросы, которые не выступают в роли аксиом, ведь все приходится доказывать. Вот мне кажется, что этот кризис был кризисом той системы оценки рисков, которая существовала ранее. Ведь все прекрасно знают, что в течение последних лет доминирующей теорией, описывающей состояние финансовых рынков, была теория эффективного финансового рынка, определяющая то, что вся информация отражается в ценах. Цена является четким индикатором того, что реально происходит и в конкретной компании или в экономике в целом. Собственно говоря, этот кризис подорвал основы этой теории, он доказал, что рынки неэффективны, что информация, которая используется для принятия инвестиционных решений, искажается, что эта информация ведет не к правильным, а к ошибочным решениям. На все это также наслаиваются внутренние, системные, операционные риски самой финансовой системы, риски деятельности финансовых институтов, отдельных операций с финансовыми инструментами. Естественно, когда мы сегодня говорим о новой модели регулирования, мы вынуждены учитывать и раскрытие информации, и новые подходы к информационному наполнению тех котировок, которые мы имеем на финансовых рынках, и подходы к регулированию деятельности финансовых посредников.

Отсюда и все то, что мы видим сегодня в дискуссиях и Группы 20, и в предстоящей дискуссии на форуме финансовой стабильности, который получил новое название, как вы знаете – Совет финансовой стабильности. Разговор идет о том, как регулировать систему рисков, которая складывается на финансовых рынках, как регулировать возможность получения инвесторами той необходимой информации, на которой можно совершать разумные операции. И, в конечном счете, это вопрос, который уводит нас к очень дискуссионной теме: что такое справедливая цена на активы, на инструменты? Является ли тот уровень цен, который мы сегодня наблюдаем в России или за рубежом на ценные бумаги справедливым уровнем цен? А это порождает постоянные разговоры о том, достигли мы дна, или может быть какая-то очередная волна. Это все на одну и ту же тему. Чувствуем мы в себе возможность оценить все риски, всю информацию, которая заложена на сегодняшнем финансовом рынке, или не чувствуем. Поэтому мне кажется, что обсуждать нужно именно это, какие препятствия есть на пути инвестора, прежде всего инвестора, для того, чтобы получить всю необходимую информацию, достоверную информацию, полную информацию, справедливую информацию, которая позволила бы ему принимать действительно правильные, точные, выверенные решения. Естественно, прогнозировать рынок невозможно, но, по крайней мере, можно ориентироваться в этой информации и руководствоваться ей.

Со стороны регуляторов, а мы также являемся регуляторами финансовых рынков, как и многие наши коллеги в других странах, мы сегодня готовим целый ряд нормативных актов, проектов законов, которые бы с нашей стороны, в нашей сфере, восполняли вот эти недостатки, о которых я сказал. Я могу назвать только несколько инициатив, которые уже сегодня вызвали бурю эмоций. Это много обсуждаемый закон о противодействии манипулированию ценами с помощью инсайдерской информации, который именно про то, о чем говорю я, потому что манипулирование ценами, инсайдерская информация искажает ценообразование не только на финансовых, но и на товарных рынках. Это вопросы, связанные с продунциальным надзором на финансовых рынках, которые предусматривают установление четких параметров и критериев о достаточности капитала участников финансового рынка, установление надежных требований к ним, чтобы они не являлись источниками раздражения и не являлись источниками проблем на финансовом рынке. В скором времени, я надеюсь, мы завершим работу над законом о секьюритизации активов, который является важным для нас законом. И мы знаем, что на сегодняшний день многие страны столкнулись как раз с проблемой секьюритизации активов. Именно эти сложные, структурированные продукты отчасти стали причиной кризиса, потому что чем сложнее продукт, тем сложнее информация о нем, тем сложнее та совокупность данных, которая позволяет принять верное решение. Но, тем не менее, для России это новый инструмент, он должен быть, и такого закона в России не существовало.

И он устанавливает новые рамки для появления таких сложных структурированных продуктов. Многое обсуждалось из наших действий за последние месяцы, прошедшие с момента кризиса. Это запреты на рискованные операции. Запреты на торговлю с определенным плечом, так называемые "маржинальные сделки", это наши известные мере по запрету коротких продаж, необеспеченных сделок. Они были нужны на определенном этапе, возможно, они были достаточно грубыми действиями. Но если вспомнить о том инструменте, которым мы располагали в момент кризиса, это были, с моей точки зрения, оптимальные действия. На сегодняшний день мы вносим изменения в регулирование сделок необеспеченных, так называемых коротких продаж. И стараемся двигаться в русле общемировой практики в этом направлении. В ближайшее время мы будем разрабатывать новое регулирование, касающееся так называемых маржинальных сделок, к регулированию плеча, которое может предоставляться брокером своему клиенту. И эта проблема тоже тянет за собой много вопросов, поскольку мы знаем, что на сегодняшний день в России появляются новые рынки, рынки, на которых нет ставшего для России традиционным 100%-ного депонирования денежных средств и акций, как на ММВБ. У нас появляются новые рынки, Российская торговая система (РТС) предлагает новые виды торгов с Центральным контрагентом, там тоже возникает целый ряд вопросов, связанных с регулированием рисков заключения сделок на этом рынке.

Короче говоря, если выстраивать всю систему регулирования финансового рынка, в зависимости от тех рисков, которые существуют, то следует начинать с раскрытия информации, с различных инициатив и норм, обеспечивающих максимальный доступ инвесторов к информации о финансовых продуктах. Надо начинать с законов, которые определяют рамки для формирования и структурирования новых финансовых инструментов, торговли с ними, до регулирования, так скажем, на микроуровне, на уровне финансовых институтов, их ответственности перед клиентами, их возможности кредитовать своих клиентов, выполнять их поручения, исполнять обязательства перед своими клиентами или перед своими контрагентами, и заканчивать вопросами, связанными с наказанием за те нарушения, которые на рынке осуществляются, потому что если нельзя отслеживать исполнение норм закона, которые регулируют поведение участников рынка, то, наверное, грош цена всем этим законам. Разумеется, вслед за этими новациями, последуют (и уже идут) соответствующие поправки в нормативные акты, которые предусматривают и повышение штрафов за нарушение операций на финансовом рынке и даже, в ряде случаев, введение уголовной ответственности за нарушение законодательства на рынке ценных бумаг, чего в России никогда не было.

Мне кажется, такой подход к проблеме предотвращения рисков является оптимальным. Речь идет даже не столько о предотвращении, потому что риски на финансовом рынке, как и на товарном, предотвратить невозможно, они всегда были и будут. Речь идет о минимизации и структурировании этих рисков, об их распределении среди разных инвесторов, предупреждении их об этих рисках. Мне кажется, в этом и состоит задача регуляторов, задача регулирования этих финансовых рынков. По крайней мере, мы это представляем себе именно так, из этого исходим, когда предпринимаем те или иные действия. Но, как было правильно сказано, у нас сегодня широкая дискуссия на эту тему, и я полагаю, что на эту проблему есть другие точки зрения. Сейчас я завершаю свое краткое выступление и готов дальше отвечать на вопросы или принять участие в дискуссии. Спасибо.

Спасибо, у нас будет еще возможность выслушать вопросы и ответы, обменяться ими между собой. Следующий выступающий – Деннис Нелли, глава Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Для начала, я хочу поблагодарить компанию Pricewaterhouse Coopers за организацию этого круглого стола, она взяла на себя важную организационную роль. Я надеюсь, что у нас все получилось. Господин Нелли, пожалуйста.

Thank you. It's good to be with you this afternoon. You know, as I reflect on the events over the last 18 months or so and think through how best to potentially deal with the crisis, and what changes we really need in order to put forward suggestions for hopefully avoiding this type of crisis in the future, at times I think that we’re all very quick to jump to a single answer. We're looking for that silver bullet, if you will, to really solve the crisis. And I guess the one thing that I have concluded coming out of this is I think we’re dealing with an incredibly complex issue that really is going to require a multifaceted approach to really deal with the issues themselves. So for example, you know, a lot of talk about what to do around regulation of the unregulated. We’ll talk about that in particular as it relates to the rating agencies, hedge funds, or securities that quite frankly are not regulated today. We will be having a legitimate debate and discussion to really focus on a lot of discussion around whether or not the transparency of risk was in fact adequate for the investors to really comprehend what they were investing in and how best to deal with that issue as well. From an accounting standpoint, I would suggest that the accounting or financial reporting model really needs to be looked at as well. And what I’m referring to, in particular, is the significant amount of off-balance sheet transactions that quite frankly never got exposure to the investor community that they otherwise might have wanted to see. This was necessary in order to really understand the nature of the securities, as they were not being reported in financial statements. I think the fundamentals around the business model is something that certainly needs to be called into question; that gets into adequacy of capital levels, and whether or not financing mechanisms of long-term or short-term assets would warrant a short-term debt is to be called into question again. I think that gets back to the risk associated with entities. Clearly, the whole issue of compensation and alignment of compensation with reward and metrics needs to be looked at as well. So I guess what I would encourage this discussion to be this afternoon is to try to take a holistic view towards those areas that we really do think we can move forward in a constructive way and not just jump to one solution versus another.

From an accounting standpoint or from an auditor’s perspective, I’d offer up maybe two or three thoughts for us to really consider this afternoon. One, I think the whole issue of transparency is one that requires a significant amount of effort. And in doing so, if we could do a much better job, both as preparers of financial statements as well as auditors of those financial statements, to really communicate to the investor community, the risk associated or the risk attendant to preparers of financial statements, and do so in a way that can be communicated in a way that investors can really understand that. I think that would really go a long way towards enhancing what we’re trying to get accomplished here.

I think the second area that would really help, and I alluded to this earlier, is to deal with the financial reporting model and I think that there are two areas that are critically important. One deals with all of the off-balance sheet-type transactions that, under the existing accounting rules, never find their way into a set of financial statements, and the second issue deals with the whole question of fair value reporting. There’s been a lot said about whether fair value has created part of the problem here. I, for one, believe accounting does not create an economic crisis and I think that’s what we really have here. There are certainly enhancements that could be made and should be made to the fair value reporting model, but nonetheless I’d hate to see us move away from that, which I believe investors are wanting to see more and more of in terms of the mark-to-market valuation of transactions that are contained in a balance sheet.

And maybe the third area I’d comment on - and this is not directly related to our topic here this afternoon, but one which I think is getting an awful lot of debate and discussion - is the issue of the independence of standard setters. I believe, because of this crisis, the whole question of how financial reporting standards are established around the globe is really called into question. In some instances, I believe that topic has become very politicised depending upon a particular country and how they view the financial reporting issues. And I would just submit that if we are to fulfil our role and responsibilities to the investor community, I believe that the independence of the financial reporting standard setters is absolutely essential for us to really continue to move forward. So, I’d offer up those thoughts as a way to get the discussion started. Thank you.

Спасибо, господин Нелли. Я считаю, что Россия находится на ранней стадии развития капитализма, и поэтому у нас активное использование забалансовых сделок, а также неограниченное вознаграждение должностным лицам принято называть коррупцией. И это ошибочное определение, потому что мы еще просто не вполне понимаем, как работают подобные механизмы. Я думаю, когда в мире будет найдена "серебряная пуля" против этих привычных инструментов, это может оказать полезное воздействие и на наше хозяйство. Я хочу спросить Тони Энджела, исполнительного управляющего директора из компании Standard & Poor's по нескольким регионам. Это один из основных игроков на рынке различных рейтингов, у него очень важная функция выставления тех оценок, на которые ориентируется огромное число участников. Как меняются ваши подходы сейчас? Как меняются ваши методики? Что вы думаете о новой ответственности тех аналитиков, которые ставят оценки? Пожалуйста!

Thank you, Valery! When you gave your initial introduction I was thinking about last night when I was coming back from this wonderful fortress. And I passed the armoury with tanks and cannons inside. I thought to myself I really should have got inside one of those before I arrived.

Хорошо, что мы с вами не там, не в крепости. Эта крепость использовалась как тюрьма. Хорошо, что мы с вами не там.

It was an impressive introduction. Let me just reflect a little on this question of risk and let me look at it, I think from the point of view of a rating agency, both on a macro level and a micro level. If we look at risk on a macro level there's no doubt that we've seen a significant increased awareness of both systemic risk and liquidity risk. In response to systemic risk, the reaction has been, and I think has rightly been, that pretty well all institutions that are systemically important need to be regulated. That wasn’t the position before. But I think if we're going to bring confidence back into the market, I think regulation of systemically important institutions is probably an important part of that confidence-building process. Certainly as a rating agency, we've been regulated for a couple of years now in the United States; rules regulating rating agencies have now been agreed for Europe and they'll be coming into force next year. You might say "do we need to rebuild market confidence in rating agencies? Do we need rating agencies?" It's one of the first questions we've reflected on and we've spoken to a number of investors about this in recent months and the answer we get is that people do feel that rating agencies have an important role. But there's no doubt that the confidence people feel in rating agencies has been very badly hit in recent months. So we think regulation plays a part in solving that problem so long as - and I think this is important - we have regulation that is globally consistent. One of the points that was made in the plenary session this morning was the way in which, in a crisis, and especially the current crisis, there's a danger of people moving from global solutions to national solutions. What investors tell us is part of the value of ratings is that they are consistent across different markets and different sectors. If you get a rating from one country then it is comparable with the rating from another jurisdiction. So I think if ratings are going to retain the value to investors that they would like them to have, then it's important that regulation is globally consistent. People want it to respect the integrity of the rating process, so undoubtedly regulation should be looking at setting out the principles, the processes, the standards to which trading should be done. However, I don't think people want ratings themselves, their integrity or their independence to be affected. So that's the sort of systemic point at the macro level. Let's look at the point of liquidity. I think one of the things that's become apparent is that ratings were used inappropriately for very different things from which they were designed. Ratings are designed to look at relative credit worthiness of institutions; corporate, sovereign, finance institutions and so on. They don't look to the volatility, the market ability or the market price of the securities. If I go back to my previous life before I joined Standard & Poor’s, I was at a law firm and 12 years ago I was a tax lawyer, and I did a lot of work with finance institutions looking at banks' trading books at that time. If you'd have looked at a bank's trading book 10 or 12 years ago, the great majority of that trading book was made up of US treasuries, Japanese government bonds, UK gilts, Deutschmark bonds - very liquid securities where it's very easy to trade it is a very established market. If you looked at banks' trading books more recently, you would find a lot of securities that may carry very high credit ratings, but that says nothing, and indeed we've seen it says nothing, about the volatility market value, etc of those instruments. I think that that liquidity risk, which is much more in people's mind, is also teaching us something about the way in which ratings were perhaps inappropriately used. We, as rating agencies, certainly recognized that we have a major part to play in helping the market better understand what ratings can do and what they can't do. That's a few observations on the macro point looking at a systemic risk in liquidity.

Let me look a little bit at the micro level. And let me face up very honestly to some of the points that have been made here. There's no question that whilst ratings in the sovereign area and in the corporate area have generally given the scale of the crisis - and I'm not just talking about our ratings, but ratings generally - have held up pretty well in that sector. They've held up in some areas of structured finance, but especially in one particular area of structured finance: those instruments based on US sub-prime mortgages. There's no question that some of the assumptions made, now that we look at it with the benefit of hindsight, were too optimistic. As a result, some of the credit enhancement that went into these instruments has proved to be, in light of events, inadequate. So certainly, we've regarded it as important that we learn the lessons from that. And we have adjusted our criteria to reflect that. We've also learned other lessons that we're trying to incorporate in what we do going forward. The point has been made about transparency, I think we have become much more transparent now in the methodologies we used, the assumptions we make, the stress testing we do, you can go on our website and see the scenario analysis we used, you can look at our assumptions and you can say well, actually, our assumptions are different. So we do "what if" scenario testing and if an investor may have a different view of the assumptions that go into an instrument, then they can test their view against our view and maybe they'll come up with a different opinion, because a rating is only an opinion about credit worthiness. Different people at different points will have different opinions.

The important point has already been said: there should be disclosure and transparency and that's an end-to-end process. We alone can't solve that problem, going to the point that Dennis made, this is a complex problem and the solutions tend to be complex. I think we need to look at an end-to-end process if we look at the structured finance market for the whole question of origination and auditing and checking of the instruments, as well as the credit rating agent's role at the end of it, including evaluating these instruments. These are all looked at and we learned the lessons from the past and do better in the future. Just to make one or two observations about areas in which ratings have held up slightly better. In the corporate or sovereign area we are seeing - and this isn't surprising as the world has become more stressed -some of those institutions; some of those ratings being revised and revised downwards. And at this point you have a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" problem where people say you are being pro-cyclical. What we try and do is rate objectively at all times. We don’t try and be counter¬cyclical, we don’t try and be pro-cyclical, we just try and give the best assessment we can of credit risk and continue to survey that credit risk over time. I think one of the problems that we've identified - and it's a systemic problem - is that the way in which ratings have been incorporated into regular tree regimes can accentuate the pro-cyclicality of the rating process. And I think one of the problems here is that fundamentally, our business model cannot depend on whether our ratings are or are not required by regulation. Ratings are only going to be valuable if investors find them valuable. If investors don't think that the research we do and the opinions we come up with are insightful then issuers are not going to pay for those ratings and fundamentally that business model is not going to be safe simply because finance regulation incorporates ratings in the regulation. So I think the answer is either you take them out or, if you put them in, then they can't be the only thing that’s in the regulation. The regulations must look more broadly at the range of factors that are relevant; that deal with all these other things that ratings don't speak to beyond credit worthiness, the look to volatility, market value and so on. So I think at that stage I’ve probably said more than enough. I've probably generated more than enough issues for people to raise in their questions so I’ll just pause there.

Спасибо, Тони. Когда вы спросили, нужны ли рейтинговые агентства, я заволновался, потому что являюсь одним из собственников ведущего российского рейтингового агентства "Эксперт РА". Я подумал, вдруг вы скажите, что они не нужны? Спасибо вам за позитивный ответ. Мне кажется, вы затронули очень важный вопрос. Ни в коем случае рейтинговые агентства не должны снимать ответственности с участников рынка, с тех, кто принимает финансовые и другие решения, рейтинговые агентства – это не замена ответственности предпринимателей. Мне кажется, в какой-то момент произошло смещение, и эти буквы «А» и «Б», плюсы и минусы, вдруг стали как будто истиной, и эти буквы надо было подставлять в формулу расчета рисков, на этой основе принимались решения. А где же, собственно, капитализм? Где предпринимательский дух? Я с вами совершенно согласен, что рейтинговые агентства должны давать открытую, серьезную и проанализированную информацию относительно состояния компании, которая должна помогать принимать решения, но, ни в коем случае, не подменять процесс принятия решений. Позвольте предоставить слово управляющему директору Rich Rating Ричарду Хантеру, он наш следующий выступающий. Ричард, пожалуйста!

Thanks, Valery. I think a number of the comments I’ll make will probably pick up from what Tony has just said and also what you said yourself, Valery, about what exactly we want ratings to be. Do we want them to be an end in themselves or a starting point? And I think there’s a number of issues also to do with the interface with regulation. In an ideal world, if a rating is an opinion, then you want lots of opinions as you build your own investment decision. You want a variety. And that doesn’t necessarily coincide very well with the idea of using ratings as a regulatory proxy. We wouldn’t have 17 competing bank supervisors in one country; therefore there is a problem if you’re using a lot of different shades of opinion as a regulatory proxy. But you do want a variety and a broad variety of opinion. You want unorthodox, spiky opinions. One thing this crisis has told us, and President Medvedev mentioned this yesterday actually, “It’s dangerous to have one way of looking at the world.” And having unorthodox and controversial opinions out there that people listen to also doesn’t necessarily coincide with having a very standardised and homogenous approach to how you might develop credit ratings or credit scores or anything else. So I think what we generally see is, as something of a consensus, is that ratings should be one point amongst us. Tony says many others that would inform prudential decisions and the investment decisions that professionals take. They should arguably be much more available and that leads us on to a second point which concerns whether we want to have many more opinions out there, and I think the market has certainly benefited from having Fitch out there as a third opinion on the global markets. Many local markets benefit from having local rating agencies. How do you support this number of ratings? One of the issues that comes up quite frequently is who pays the rating agencies. And there’s been a lot of discussion of the fact that, obviously, the large international agencies are largely paid by fees from the issuers, which is entirely true. There is a conflict of interest there and one that we believe we manage. We believe the track record across many of our areas of coverage, corporate, sovereigns, banks and large parts of structured finance, bears that out. One thing that’s important to bear in mind is that when people talk about other ways of encouraging rating agencies out there, then it is important to have a variety of models, but at the same time, all of them will have a conflict of interest. All of them will be paid by somebody. If you had an investor paid model, you would have a high concentration of people who are paying you on the investor side. Last year we witnessed probably the loudest voices arguing against a number of our rating actions which were not from issuers that we rated, but from investing institutions who were going to lose money as one of the effects of ratings coming down. Obviously, a large number of the investors who would pay us under an investor-paid model would also be rated entities. So there will be a conflict there. If we look at an alternative plan, whereby agencies might be paid for by the government – this has been raised occasionally in the European Union – again, you can fairly quickly identify conflicts of interest in a system that is effectively nationalised.

Governments have their own mandates. Governments have a primary responsibility to insure financial stability and if we’re honest, independent and objective, then some of the things we’re going to say are not going to help financial stability. So there’s no real model out there that you would say is free from conflicts of interest. The important thing is that we both manage those conflicts and that we are seen to manage those conflicts. And that is one of the areas where it’s important to note that we welcome regulation on a constructive basis, because it can help communicate how we manage those conflicts of interest and how we manage our affairs. One of my previous roles within Fitch was looking at how we rolled out the IOSCO code, which was a broad universal framework for how agencies should manage their relationships, and that made us a more transparent and frankly better managed company. regulation and the inspection of governance certainly contribute towards that. We should, however, bear in mind the limitations on what regulation can achieve on an opinion that we provide. Regulators – and I’m sure they’d be the first to admit this – cannot provide us with a better crystal ball. The future will occasionally turn out not as we forecast it and not as many other people forecast it. So if our expectation in any way, shape, or form is that the capacity for rating opinions to differ from how the future turns out or if we expect the regulation would address or remove that, then I think it’s ultimately important to accept that that won’t be the case. That’s a limitation. With that in mind, it’s also important when we look at where the regulation comes from and how that regulation is structured, that the methodologies, the content of the ratings themselves, should be left to the individual rating agencies. And again, we tend to find that regulators are happy with this. They don’t want to tell us how to structure the content of our ratings. But we do have a job to do in convincing other constituencies that it’s important the methodologies stay independent together with the work with the rating agencies.

Now we’ve had various proposals in the US. We had one proposal that said all ratings should be placed on one scale. We’ve had an equal proposal in the European Union that says ratings should be placed on more than one scale. Clearly, the ideal solution is that the rating agencies themselves determine how many and what kind of scales are used and if the regulators wish to employ those skills in different manners or more importantly, employ additional measures in prudential regulation, then that would be the way to address it. And then just one last point to echo what we’ve heard over the last few days as well as what we’ve heard this afternoon: the importance of a global approach towards regulation. It is very important if we are to continue to be able to operate the type of service that we do, that regulation is global. We are a global company. That has many benefits for the investors and the other people who use our ratings. It would be very difficult for us to structure ourselves along national lines. My lead analyst for Volkswagen is based in Paris. My lead analyst for Deutsche Telekom is based in Moscow. My lead retail analyst for Europe is based in Paris and that’s exactly the way I like it. That brings a level of objectivity, independence and perspective to our ratings which is extremely valuable and that we absolutely should not lose by having a high degree of national regulation. Rather, as I think we’ve had here in Russia, we should have a view to look towards what the G20 put forward and what other international bodies look at as an international consensus to make improvements. And we know there must be improvement and we know there must be improvement forward for all of us. Thanks.

Спасибо. Вы затронули очень важный вопрос: кто платит за рейтинги? Я говорил в самом начале, что когда развернулся кризис, очень много стали говорить опять о роли государства, и нейтральным решением вопроса представляется ситуация, когда будут платить не эмитенты и не инвесторы, а государство. Ну, мне кажется, это очень опасный путь, это опять путь по перекладыванию ответственности, ведь если государство будет платить за рейтинги, рано или поздно наступит следующий кризис, это неизбежно. Тогда инвесторы побегут к государству и скажут, – "Зачем же вы нас обманули? Верните наши деньги обратно!" И тогда стучаться в дверь государственных институтов будут не только рабочие профсоюзы, но еще и предприниматели с инвесторами. И это уже будет что-то такое… похожее на гиперсоциализм, социализм в большей степени, чем был у нас в Советском Союзе, потому что тогда хотя бы не было предпринимателей, а были только одни рабочие. Мне кажется, это очень важная тема, о которой у нас принято говорить, о ней часто говорят наш президент и премьер. Они опасаются, как это ни странно, нас упрекают в очень сильной, избыточной роли государства в России, но они, напротив, все время указывают, что не следует государству слишком глубоко влезать в экономический и инвестиционный процесс.

Я хочу предоставить слово Йонг Хи Ли, может быть, тему локальных рейтинговых агентств он затронет в своем выступлении, чуть раньше об этом сказал Ричард. Пожалуйста.

Thank you, it's nice to be here. The name of my company name is NICE, so maybe you'll never forget my company. Nice to see you again. Actually in Korea there are three local crediting agencies as you know, but it's quite different from global players like Fitch and SNP or Moody's. Why did Korea create three crediting agencies in the 1980s? Actually, in the 60s and 70s Korea's financial market was not developed based on credit ratings, rather most financial transactions were based on collateral or guarantee, and not on a credit basis, so these systems were not enough when the Korean economy grew. In the 80's in order to meet increasing corporate financing needs, alternatives were sought to vitalise the market based on credit ratings. This is why in 1985 and 1986 three agencies were introduced by the government. Financial companies, including commercial banks were the major shareholders. After the Asian financial crisis in 1987 and 1998 financial institutions started to sell their shares. In 2000 the shareholding ratio was introduced to secure independence of CRAs in Korea. Financial companies, including the banking business and a large group of companies as prescribed by trade law are not allowed to own more than 10 percent of CRA shares. Korea's crediting market is just over 10 years old, but is still regulated by the government. After the financial crisis of 1986-87 tough regulations on CRAs were introduced. Still the scope of credit rating activities is very limited in Korea. CRAs are strictly licensed. We can rate corporate fund and commercial people . This year, in March, revisions were made to the crediting regulations. The so-called Credit Information act, which governs Korean crediting agencies, was revised. Firstly, the rating activities were broadened. This is so-called mutual fund rating. Possibly, after 6 months we can do business, do some fund rating, including non-profit organisation ratings including schools, etc. If one of the Korean credit rating agencies want to sell the company to anybody else then it needs to be approved in advance by the government. Also strengthening of internal international control standards on CRA's. The separation of rating business from marketing business which will seriously affect our activities in the future. Also avoidance of conflict of interests, ban on the activities.

Also we are operating an independent credit rating committee which prevents any intervention of management in ratings. So, as a whole, Korean rating business is somewhat in an infant state compared with advanced global players. Still, what we can do is just conduct local credit rating business. We are not allowed to do any sovereign ratings so far. Thank you.

Спасибо, господин Ли. Нам, к сожалению, тоже запрещено. Мы бы рады, но не можем расширить свою деятельность. Вы сказали, что в Корее три агентства. В России, кажется, уже десяток локальных рейтинговых агентств. Русские – очень увлекающиеся люди. Нам понравилось это новое занятие и сразу возникает целая куча агентств, и мы начинаем все друг друга расталкивать. Это, кстати, тоже вопрос. Сколько должно быть агентств? Если их мало, есть ли опасность монополии или олигополии? Если их много, не начинается ли избыточная конкуренция и, в связи с этим, дальнейшее снижение качества рейтингов? Может быть, господин Аркулли затронет этот вопрос? Как сказывается сама структура этого рынка в том числе и на биржевой торговле? Пожалуйста.

Thank you very much. Firstly, I would like to apologise for being late but I was delayed unavoidably. Secondly, it’s great to take part in today’s discussion with very experienced and knowledgeable panel members, including the Chairman. Perhaps briefly I’ll try and talk about Hong

Kong, which is an active, international city, in one or two minutes. And in fact, in terms of participating in the World Federation of Exchanges, Hong Kong holds the vice-chair of the Board of Directors and indeed chairs the Working Committee which basically looks after policy issues overseas as well as other WFE projects.

Thirdly, our Securities and Futures Commission is also a member of and recently chaired the taskforce on short selling. was asked to report on it and the Monetary Authority, which is our Central Bank equivalent, is also a member of the Financial Stability Forum, now the Financial Stability Board. So, I think, for a small community of 7 million people, we like to think that we are actually punching above our weight. In terms of the exchange, itself, we are demutualized. We're a listed company but we also have a regulatory function. The companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Exchange are regulated by the exchange itself, with the exception that we do not regulate ourselves. We are regulated by the SFC. But in terms of shareholder interests and public interest, by law, the Hong Kong Exchange is required to put public interest ahead of shareholder interest. So when you’re talking about issues of conflict of interests that puts it really very, very clear.

But getting back to our predicament that the world finds itself in, I think whenever you deal financial markets, it is by nature complex. Apart from anything else the different markets, the different level of regulation, the different stages of development make it quite difficult, even amongst the more developed markets, and you take New York, London, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Hong Kong, wherever the developed markets are. The governance model and the rules and regulation and the risk are provided for differently. The big difference for instance between the American model of regulation and some other major jurisdictions like London and Hong Kong would be that America is rule-based whereas, I think, in England and Hong Kong we believe in a principal base. So under rule basing, and I think this is one of the subjects that’re going to be under discussion for the new architecture as to how we can improve, is that if you have a rule-based system you tick all the boxes and you say, “Right, I’m home and dry.” And that’s that. But that’s, as I say, an oversimplification. And of course the other aspect is that when you have rule-based and principal-based companies, private sector companies, alike, do try to have some sort of a regulatory arbitrage. They tend to run to the markets that perhaps are the least technical, the easiest to comply with in terms of rules, etc. But I think at the end of the day, I think all major international financial centres and the regulators and the people involved understand that to attract investors, to keep investor confidence, to attract quality companies, you need to have quality markets. You need to have markets that provide a good balance of rules and regulation, including risk management, governance, transparency and all of that. It’s easy to write it down in a book, but to actually have proper oversight and supervision and enforcement of it is quite different, because I think there are probably enough lawyers on this speaker panel to testify to that, including my friend on my left who is in the accounting profession. But we are professionals, and are paid to circumvent rules. We are paid to comply with them legally and that’s where our skill lies. When you have that sort of attention then you tend to sometimes . If you asked me what created the financial crisis and economic crisis today, then it probably comes down to one word - greed. If you look at the shadow banking system: some of you may have heard this morning that the shadow banking system at least in the United States was the creator of 50% of the debt, unregulated. Going forward looking at new rules of engagement, I think, amongst the more mature markets you can develop it, you can improve it including, for instance, dealing with the issue that the last three speakers have dealt with in terms of credit rating agencies. But that was simply one factor that came up. It wasn’t the cause; I don't think you can blame the rating agencies as the cause.

The financial structured product got so complicated that the people who thought they knew what they were doing or the issuers didn’t fully understand the risks themselves. That’s not an excuse for them and therefore if you don’t understand it as an issuer, how on earth can you expect investors who are purchases of that risk to actually understand it. So, I think from that point of view there’s a lot of examination that we need to look at ourselves. We have a particular issue in Hong Kong with the collapse of Lehman Brothers where 40,000 of our investors invested something like USD 3 billion into a Lehman structured product. And you know there is a great debate and a great complaint going on now between some of the investors and the regulators and say they should not have authorised the product or they should not have approved the product or that they were misselling and so on and so forth. You do tend to get caught up with all these micro issues. Tony mentioned looking at credit rating agency and the new order coming out of the G20 meeting about regulating systemically important institutions. I don’t exactly know how you define that because if things are structured, as Dennis said, off-balance sheet and you actually don’t have enough data, you know, the chain is as strong as the weakest link. And you do have another example in the dark liquidity pools which compete with stock exchange for exchange-traded product. But again, that pool of members has no central clearing and one collapse or one transaction can actually trigger a collapse of all the members of that particular group. So I think one of the lessons that is learned - and speaking as an operator of an exchange is good for our business - is that I think there will be shift of products into a transparency, into proper governance and coming into a central clearing system or a properly risk-managed clearing system that will have the transparency and that will allow the market to actually be a judge of that.

But the last point that I'd like to make is that there’s a lot of discussion on whether we have super regulators? Again, you have different models. England believes in super regulation and yet on this particular occasion there was supposedly a gap between the Bank of England and the FSA in terms of some of the institutions that were regulated by the FSA. But the Bank of England did not have enough information as to what to do in times of stress of additional capital. There’s no perfect system. But I believe in going forward and I believe that capital markets are not dead. I believe in free market, well-managed, well-regulated markets where people understand the risk, both at the corporate level as well as at the investor level. And I just hope that that we don’t do what I call a paper overkill in terms of over-correcting some of the issues that we have come across. Yes, we are facing very tough times unfortunately. Unemployment and therefore to the governments and the politicians involved it’s a real temptation to do an overkill. But when you look at continuing development, continued economy growth, better lives for everybody, I just hope that we will be able to find the right balance. Thank you very much.

Спасибо, господин Аркулли. Вы сказали, что жадность – главная причина кризисов, финансовых кризисов. У меня вопрос к доктору Стивену Мейджору. Не следует ли поручить рейтинговым агентствам оценивать степень жадности участников рынка? Это откроет дополнительные возможности по развитию агентств. И, например, ввести дополнительный налог на степень жадности.

I’m an economist and, as an economist, you always assume that there is greed and self-interest. So in that sense, I think the rating would be, in principle, quite high. Thank you for the interesting introduction, Mr Chairman, I was one of the people this morning that voted in the plenary panel on your expectation regarding changes in the regulatory structure and architecture and I think, like we’ve seen in the past, that any major change in regulation is the result of a crisis. Considering the current crisis, we can expect that there will be a major change in the regulations in oversight in the regulatory architecture in the next couple of years or even now, it’s happening now, and I think we should use the momentum to come up with a good regulation; high quality regulation. Being one of the last people on this panel and already having a panel this morning on the changes in regulation, it’s not easy to come up with a new perspective and a new insight. And in that sense some of the comments I will make are similar to previous comments made either here or this morning. There are two issues I would like specifically to reflect on and to comment on. First is the whole issue of fair value accounting; the issue to what extent fair value accounting has made the problem worse, has increased the problems of the current crisis. And the second issue I would like to discuss is the issue of international cooperation. The problem of having a situation of national regulators within countries but on the other hand, activities that are, by nature, international, and how we go about that problem. So let’s go first to the fair value problem and, as has also been mentioned in this session before, there has been some argument that the fair value issue or the fair value evaluations has aggravated the problem, has made the crisis even deeper and I don’t support that argument. I think in some sense it’s a classical situation of shoot the messenger. I think the transparency as a result of fair values has helped to bring the problems to the surface. And also, I think that we should realise that important shares of the financing institutions of their banks, of their asset sides are not based on fair values in the current situations but still based on the historical cost model. Actually I think that is also a general expectation. If you look to the future, we can expect more write-offs and I don’t think that at this stage we can assume that the equity levels amongst the financial institutions are undervalued and I actually expect that there will be more write-offs when the crisis starts to hit the real economy – the actual economy – and there will be a further reduction in the equity values of the financial institutions. So in that sense, I think there is no reason to assume that fair values have made the problem worse. Another problem with fair value or another development with fair values is the political influence that has developed in the past year regarding standard setting.

Until some time ago, standard setting of financial statements; of financial standards, was considered to be a technical issue. Clearly there is more and more political influence on standard setting and financial reporting and I’m very concerned about this development. High quality standards need to have a long term perspective and need to be set in independence and clearly there are some demands. There have been some demands for short term changes to the financial reporting model and standards and I think this affects quality and has a negative impact for the quality of financial standards. Also, we should realise that some of the political influence is coming from parties that are currently large owners of banks. Governments are now owning large shares of banks and I think there is some risk of having too much government involvement in setting those standards. Clearly, there needs to be accountability around standard setting. There are still some problems in IFRS and also in US GAAP that need to be solved but in essence, I think we should be very careful about having short term political influence on the standard settings side. Related to that issue is what the function of financial statements is. Should they be focused on investors? Should they be focused on the investor perspective? Or should there also be a prudential element or solvency element within financial statements? And clearly, working at a securities regulator, I think the prime objective of financial statements should be helping investors to make decisions and we should be very careful about getting the other objective, the prudential objective or the solvency objective, into IFRS because in the end, I think it will hurt the transparency for investors. In that sense, I’m fully supportive of the so-called twin peaks model. The twin peaks model follows that there are clear different objectives. On the one hand, you have the objective of the investors. On the other hand, you have the objective of solvency of prudential regulation and I think we should disentangle those and keep them separate and use the financial statements primarily for the perspective of transparency and the perspective of investors.

Now moving on to the second subject, international cooperation. At first, you can say that by definition, we are in a sub-optimal situation. Auditing, credit rating agencies, banks and insurance companies by definition are involved in international activities and regulators have to work with that from a national perspective. And I think we have to accept that situation but it’s clear that that is a difficult position to start from. Given the situation, I think regulators have an obligation and do their best to work together and to cooperate and make sure that, given the situation, they still get the best results. There has been a lot of discussion about the reasons for having regulatory cooperation and there have been discussions about improving the information sharing between regulators. One area that I would like to emphasise is the whole problem of regulatory competition. The competition between the financial centres based on regulation. We have seen this in the past decades. We’ve seen fierce competition between New York and London on regulation and also in my own area within the European Union, we have seen a lot of competition between the member states on the basis of regulation. I think that is a risky situation where there are high risks of a local favourable treatment of financial institutions. And I think one important reason for having regulatory corporation is to avoid competition among regulators. To get to the situation where there are more powers at a central level and – let’s take my own area – I think it's unavoidable within the European Union; we will need more powers at the central level and, of course, this is a sensitive issue moving powers from local member states to the European level. But we have done it before.

We have the Euro – that is of course also an area where there have been powers moved from some member states to the European level. And also in competition policy, we have decided that important parts of competition policy are already at the European levels. So in that sense, I think we should be optimistic. It’s not an easy problem, but we should be optimistic that in the end, we will make a move towards more cooperation at the European level because it’s required by the international activities that are conducted by the Finnish participants. And as a last part on this international cooperation, there is now a regulation in Europe that is accepted – European regulations that regulates credit rating agencies. I think it’s a very good start. It is a regulation that is currently going through the political process at the European Union level. It regulates both the independence and the transparency side of credit rating agencies. It also uses the concept of colleges of regulators, so regulators from different member states of the European Union will sit together and form a college of regulators and CESR, which is the European Committee of Securities Regulators, will have a prominent role; a leading role in the system. It’s a good start. There is still some unclarity of how it will actually function in practice but I really hope that it will result in a situation where these colleges of regulators will working together and we can avoid a situation of regulatory competition between those individual regulators. So to conclude, I think it’s needed and it’s unavoidable that we will move also in Europe, to a situation of more powers at the European level. Thank you very much.

Спасибо, Стивен Мейджор. Я хочу передать слово Ховарду Дэвису, директору Лондонской школы экономики. Не могу вам задавать вопросы, потому что было бы странно, если бы я задавал вопросы директору такого знаменитого учебного заведения. Пожалуйста.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the absence of a question. I was going to say a few things about the overall global financial architecture and how well it has performed in this crisis, because that is a particular interest of mine and I have written a book about it, but I don't know if other people feel this, plus there is a danger at this point after almost an hour and a half of discussion where everybody is pretending to agree with everybody else. And you start to think maybe someone should throw some grit into the machine. So instead, I am going to not do that and I am just going to disagree with a few things that have been said and hope that that causes one or two people to wake up. First of all, what Ronald Arculli said, that greed was the basis of this crisis. Well, I just don't agree. Of course, as Steven said, greed is always there. And if greed was the cause of the crisis, we would have a permanent crisis because I do not know any way in which you can regulate greed away. You just have to take that for granted – and it is also called profit maximisation, by the way, greed. And in that context we think it's quite good. So, I think you have to take that for granted and you have to say that the regulatory environment needs to impose certain constraints on that, so that it doesn't get out of hand. And so I do think it's the constraints and the regulatory environment in which I include also military policy, because I think military policy went seriously wrong in the United States in the early part of this millenium, and that's where we must look to for answers. If we conclude that it's greed, then we'll never find an answer and we'll be in a state of permanent crisis. So I think he's wrong and we should all hope he's wrong. Secondly, I disagree with him on his diagnosis of what went wrong in London. I think the Bank of England knew everything it needed to know about the banking question, it just didn't agree that it should provide liquidity support for it. And since, of course, subsequently, the bank had to be nationalised, because it wasn't solvent, then it's arguable that the bank was quite right that it shouldn't have been trying to rescue a bank through endless liquidity support, which actually needed to be rescued in a different way. So I think to regard it as an information problem is wrong.

Unless anyone thinks I'm just picking on Ronald, let me turn to Steven. I simply don't understand this point about the twin peaks model. I mean, it's fine to say let's have transparency without fear of failure, but if transparency reveals that an institution is insolvent, then you've got to do something about it. So you can't divorce the two aspects of regulation and just have one person saying these things and nobody else thinking about it. I mean, the two have to be brought together somewhere, so I just don't understand that point. Secondly, on competition between regulators, I think there is reasonable competition and unreasonable competition. You said that the competition was about national treatment – we're talking about London and New York. I simply don't think that's true. I don't think there has been any national favorable treatment in London for mobile phones. In fact, mostly we don't have any anyway. We don't have any investment banks. This has been about creating an appropriate regulatory environment for safe business, so this is not to say we've got it right all the time. Indeed, I don't think we have in all respects. But I think that if you talk about striving in a regulated centre to achieve the optimal regulatory environment, which balances systemic safety and innovation, why should everybody always reach the same answer to that question. If that's what you mean by regulatory competition, I can't see what the problem with it is. So I think we've got to be very clear here about what we like and what we don't like in terms of competition. So Steven again. You say that credit rating regulation in Europe is a good first step in what has been devised. I think it's a bad first step. I think that what rating agencies really needed was the global scheme of regulation. And in fact, as Richard said, the IOSCO code was actually quite a good start. It was quite a helpful thing.

And I think what should have happened, is that we should have been able to achieve a global regulatory environment for rating agencies. Instead, we've got two different regimes: a European regime and an American regime for the same agencies. That's not a good first step. That's a step backwards. Also, in Europe we have a regime, which is very confused as to which responsibilities are national and which responsibilities are European. And Steven refers to the role of CESR. Well, yes. CESR may play a helpful role, but it will have to do so really in the absence of appropriate powers. Now here, finally, unless Steven thinks I'm picking exclusively on him, let me say that I do agree with you completely about the need for more pan-European regulation, and I think in this area it is absolutely needed. My government will not thank me for this because they don't agree with this, but I disagree with my government on this. I say that, but I haven't looked at the BBC website for half an hour, so I may not have a government, because it is possible that it's gone. But if it's still there, I disagree with it because I do think that in Europe if we are going to have pan-European institutions who are able using a regulatory permission to do business all across the continent, then Steven is absolutely right in that we have to have more central control and I think that what the crisis has revealed is that we have an incoherent system in Europe, a complicated mish-mash of national and pan-European regulation. That's probably enough disagreement, chairman, and I could probably find some other points to disagree on if you like, but I'll leave it at that.

Спасибо. У меня созрел вопрос относительно глобального центра управления. Где он будет? Кто будет его акционерами? И от каких факторов зависят доли в этом центре? Вот, скажем, Россия производит небольшой ВВП. Но у России очень большая территория. Будет ли приниматься во внимание наша территория или природные ресурсы, или, скажу больше, наличие атомных бомб?

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